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The thesis and papers of R. Palmer, J. Taylor and P. Stigger convey the 
impression that the Colonial Office and the Chartered Company were somehow 
antagonistic to each other, that Directors were constantly either challenging 
or circumventing the Colonial Office. They seem also to accept without question 
that the Colonial Office was an altruistic institution cast in the role of . 
defender and champion of native interests and thwarted only by the Company's 
machinations. This paper attempts to show, from information gathered as a 
sideline to other research, that far from opposing the Company the Colonial 
Office agreed in principle with the Company and as far as they could promoted ,, 
the Company's interests. The grant of a charter to combined London and Cape 
financial concerns was not an aberration but a deliberate act of policy, and 
it is unreasonable to assume that having granted it, the government would 
henceforth deliberately oppose the enterprise of those who had been thus 
favoured. The only consideration that inhibited the full co-operation of 
the Colonial Office was public opinion as expressed at Westminster.
A Chartered company had several advantages from the government's point 
of view. In the first place it avoided, initially, direct annexation. As 
J.S. Moffat commented on the R6v. John Mackenzie's opposition to a chartered ” 
company administering Bechuanaland: 'The British Government cannot take the 
required position-'/Of keeping mischief-makers out of the country and of 
advancing the gold-mining industry/ without annexation of some kind, and 
annexation would be violently repudiated by the Chief and his people.'(1)
In the'case of the other chartered companies direct annexation might have run 
the risk of active opposition from Spain and Holland in North Borneo, from 
France in West Africa and from Germany in East Africa, or have raised the quest­
ion of compensation for those countries elsewhere. Annexation would also have 
incurred administration by the imperial authorities, and, considerations of 
expense apart, government in the nineteenth century was still largely based 
on the principles of laissez-faire and no state interference. Though the 
mercantile classes may well have t’.Jught it the duty of the state to 'hold 
the ring',(2) that was as far us they wished the state to go. It was accepted . 
that the government would not attempt to open up undeveloped countries by 
expenditure from the British Exchequer.(3) The corollary of course was that 
such work should be left to private enterprise - as long as it was profitable.
A Chartered Company was also useful in concealing strategic designs.
All four British chartered companies not only ensured that reputedly valuable 
areas should not fall into the hands of foreign states, but they were also 
all strategically placed. The territory held by the North Borneo Company 
lay on the track of Britain's 'immense trade'(4) with China, Japan and 
Australia, and contained fine harbours and coaling stations 'which we should 
scarcely like to see in the possession tif a hostile power'.(5) The presence.jCP 
of the Royal Niger Company prevented the advance of France to the mouth, of"tjhe,./' 
Niger, and the Imperial British East Africa Company directed its activities' , / 
to the headwaters of the Nile to secure that strategic area from France and
2Germany. The British South Africa Company not only thwarted the designs 
of Germany, Portugal and the South African Republic in Central Africa7 but 
it would secure the predominance of British influence over that of the Boers 
in South Africa without the direct interference of the British Government.
As Sir Alfred Milner, when High Commissioner, said, ‘The successful develop­
ment of Rhodesia /under the Company/ means we win the South African game 
all round,1 and an Imperial Officer there, as he suggested, would give the 
Imperial Government 'maximum powers without taking over the whole government.1(6) 
This was no doubt one powerful reason for not revoking the Charter in 1894 
and 1896. .. Like the other Chartered Companies the British South 'Africa 
Company was a political as much as a commercial concern; as Sir John Gorst 
said of the North Borneo Company, it was 'a means by which Great Britain is 
to avoid direct responsibility ... in point of fact it is a sort of filibuster­
ing by proxy.'(7)
The plea of avoiding expense to the British taxpayer by .granting 
charters was not an entirely honest one. The cost of the defence of the
whole Empire, apart from India, was almost entirely met by the Imperial 
Government, and the chartered companies were well aware that in times of 
difficulty they could rely on the support of Imperial troops and the Royal 
Navy. Rhodes' intention to remain under the British flag was not altogether 
a matter of sentiment. Basi1 Williams quoted 'a cynic' as saying that if
the results of a Chartered company's enterprise were good they could be made 
the property of the state; if the value were little, the company could be 
left to its own devices.(8) This is patently untrue. The North Borneo 
Company, after initial difficulties when an application for government help 
was considered, went from strength to strength and retained its charter until 
1946. The other three chartered companies were supported while they existed 
with loans (The Royal Niger Company) and railway guarantees (Imperial British 
East India and British South Africa) without prior reference to Parliament, 
and were handsomely compensated when their Charters were surrendered, and were 
left besides with their land, mineral and railway holdings. Sir Henry Loch . 
calculated that from 1890 to 1894 the British Government incurred upwards 
of Seven hundred thousand pounds expenditure exclusive of railway land grants 
in the interests of the Company in the Protectorate and that though the 
Government paid a thousand pounds a year to the Company for the use of the 
telegraph through the Protectorate, the Company paid nothing for the use Of 
the telegraph through British Bechuanaland.(9) Charters, a member of the 
House' of Commons concluded, were an arrangement by which the Treasury was 
(nominally) protected from expenditure in a country from which the company 
was to take the profits,(10) profits which could equally well have been a source 
of revenue^to the country's government.(11)
The first application in Britain " - a charter was made by the North 
Borneo Compainy to Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office in 1878 but it was left 
tb the anti-expansionist Liberals to grant the charter in 1881, with the frank 
admission by the Foreign Secretary Lord Granville that
'if a case should present itself which promised great advan­
tages to our political and commercial interests with an 
absence of reasonable ground for apprehending military and 
financial burdens, it would be the act of doctrinaires not 
of statesmen, to refuse to go into an examination of such , -
a case.'(12)
None of the Charters was discussed bjkParliament before being;granted to the 
companies. Lawyers had found good reasons why they need not be submitted to 
Parliament,(13) and they were in fact granted by the prerogative of the Crown,(14) 
a return to such things as were done in the days of the Stuarts,(15) and to 
which many members of Parliament strongly objected, not only because such
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large territories were conferred on commercial companies without the concurrence 
of Parliament,(.16) but also because the Charters did in fact, if not in theory, 
confer monopolies.(17)
The difference betweien the old and the new charters was that the new 
charters did not purport to grant monopolies.(18) But the suggestion to amal­
gamate all the interested companies in central Africa had come from the Colonial 
Office.(19) The granting of the charter was defended in the House of Commons 
by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies as being the best mode of . 
putting an end to all exclusive and competing concessions in that part of Africa.(20] 
Sir Hercules Robinson recommended the granting of a monopoly as the best means 
of avoiding the evils resulting from the opposite course in Swaziland,(21) and 
Moffat, though admitting with the Rev. John Mackenzie the injustice of mono­
polies, favoured one as the best means of keeping the peace.(22) In the 
absence of direct Imperial involvement this was probably true. That the 
Colonial Office was aware of the possibility of the charge of monopoly, the 
antithesis of professed free trade principles, is revealed in Clause 33 of the 
Charter. This, Knutsford explained, provided for the alteration or repeal 
of the Charter at the end of twenty-five years and of succeeding ten-year 
periods, thus 'precluding any objection which might be made that the grant of 
the Charter locks up indefinitely a large portion of South Africa in the hands 
of a commercial association.'(23)
The.Rudd Concession gave the Company the mineral monopoly of Matabeleland 
and Mashonaland,(24) and the Lippert Concession secured the exclusive right to 
grant land,(25) but in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, in the field of operations 
granted to the Charter, other contenders already had claims and concessions.
In considering these the Colonial Secretary explained that it had been hoped 
that the Company would obtain from the Native Chiefs such undertakings as would 
practically give them 'the control of the whole territory' described in the 
Charter as forming their principle field of operations.(26) A Concessions 
Commission was suggested in 1892 to recognise claims as a step towards raising 
a revenue. No claim subsequent to the granting of the Charter was to be 
recognised,(27) but Rhodes was not at first in favour of a Commission, as the 
local officers 'could not be relied on to take such a broad view of the 
questions at issue' as Loch and Shippard.(28) Both the High Commissioner's 
views then(29) and the Colonial Office's later(30) were that the Chartered 
Company would be more likely to develop the country than the original concess­
ionaires, or individual concessionaires with little or no money.
The draft instructions to the Concessions Inquiry Commission included 
the advice that no inquiry was to be made into the merits of any claim until 
the Commission were satisfied that sufficient notice of the claim had been 
given to the Company, and that the Company should be entitled to receive copies 
of all documents deemed to affect its interests in connection with the inquiry.(31) 
The Colonial Office adopted the principle that monopolist rights with regard 
to minerals should be of limited duration as should the pre-emptive right of the 
Company to obtain new concessions of land and minerals, the period to be 
arranged between Her Majesty's Government and the Chartered Company, 'with full 
power of Her Majesty's Government to extend the period should circumstances 
render that course desirable':(32) the inevitable saving clause. Thus with 
the sanction of the Colonial Office the Company eventually became the owners 
of vast concessions in the entire area of its field of operations, outside 
those areas reserved to the Chiefs in Bechuanaland and Barotseland,(33) 
but the others who came in to share its rights were subsidiary companies of the 
British South Africa Company and syndicates under the direction of friends and 
associates of the parent"'body.
Colonial Office support in the establishment of the Company in
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Mashonaland was unstinting. As by Clause 30 'Our naval and military officers . 
shall give full force and effect to this Our Charter, and shall recognise and 
be in all things aiding to the Company and its officers', the Company was 
assured of Imperial support. From March 1889 when a new site for a Police 
camp was chosen near the disputed territories and the Grobler pont,(34) the 
Bechuanaland Police were used by the High Commissioner, with the sanction of 
the Colonial Office, not only for the ostensible purpose of keeping order in 
the’ Protectorate, defending Khama from attack, and deterring Boer freebooters, 
but also with the unavowed intention of keeping within easy reach of the 
Company's field of active operations should the necessity for their services 
arise. Protestations were made about the expense of keeping so large a body 
of police so far north and the High Commissioner was asked if any reduction 
could prudently be made.(35) A week later however he was informed that he 
could tell Rhodes that he need not be alarmed at this despatch as the Secretary 
of State would do nothing until he had received Colonel Carrington's report.(36) 
These preparations for the protection of the Company and its eventual entry 
into its field of operations were further supported by the Colonial Office 
and the Crown Agents in their expeditious handling of the telegraph contract 
before the Charter had been assented to,(37) and the co-operation of the 
Government in the provision of men and equipment for the entry of the Company's 
column into Mashonaland(38) could hardly have been more complete if the Govern­
ment had been acting on its own behalf instead of that of a commercial company.
Imperial protection was maintained at the Limpopo Drifts after the 
occupation until the Adendorff crisis was passed and until the difficulties 
with the Portuguese in Manical and were settled and the Company were in a 
position to take over the frontier defence at Tuli and the Drifts.(39) A 
considerable Imperial force, however, remained at Makloutsie,(40) waiting 
for the inevitable collision, which eventually occurred in the middle of 1893. 
The wire-cutting episode, which was the occasion of the opening of hostilities, 
took place at the beginning of May,(41) and at once the Makloutsie force was 
put on the alert.(42)
The Company was unprepared for any forward movement, and in view of the 
dangers of precipitate action the Hi gw Commissioner had prohibited any move 
without his sanction.(43) The Colonial Secretary doubted whether the inter­
ruption of telegraphic communication would constitute ground for an aggressive 
movement without the permission of the High Commissioner.(44) Until a cause 
for such a move occurred the provision of horses and ammunition for Khama to 
the extent of four thousand pounds was approved, the Bechuanaland Police 
strengthened, and Colenbrander advised that no expense was to be spared in 
keeping the High Commissioner informed of what was going on in Matabeleland.(45) 
In August the .Imperial Secretary declared the casus belli:
'Impis cannot be allowed to remain in the near neighbourhood 
of European settlement or mining operations as their pre­
sence would prevent the free exercise of those concessions 
which the British South Africa Company acquired and from 
which Lobengula received and is receiving large annual 
payments.'(46)
The decision as to when the proximity of the impis became dangerous was f
dependent on the probable nearness of the rains, and th^arrival of the horses 
from Transvaal, with a sufficient time all owed for their recuperation from the 
journey. (47) As the Company could '’neither stand protracted expense nor 
lengthened uncertainty, they were to tell Sir*Henry Loch of their desire to 
require the withdrawal of the impis,(48) and the Colonial Office agreed that 
as prompt action might be necessary in certain eventualities, the High 
Commissioner should have the authority, without waiting for confirmation from 
the Colonial Office, to inform the Company that they must exercise their own
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discretion as to the best means of securing the safety of the people.(49)
In other words, the Colonial Office agreed that when preparations were com­
plete the Company were to use their own discretion as to the opportune time 
for a forward movement. They continued to proffer men and munitions from 
Imperial resources in South Africa,(50) and agreed that the Bechuanaland troops 
could be deployed within the Company's territories to cause a diversion,(51) 
and that Cape and Natal soldiers should be allowed to engage in the Bechuanaland 
Mounted Police if operations had to be postponed because of the wet season,, 
in order as Loch put it, 'to finish the whole business'.(52)
A significant footnote to the Victoria Incident was the Inquiry which 
the Colonial Office arranged - for public consumption rather than as a means 
of determining the truth. It was to be entrusted to some officer with the 
necessary professional training but wholly unconnected with the political 
aspects of the question.(53) The officer selected was F.J. Newton,(54) a 
member of the staff of the Governor of the Cape, Sir Henry Loch, and friend 
since Oxford days of Rhodes and Maguire. It was to be made clear to Newton 
that his mission was merely to inquire into the events at Victoria that 
preceded the MatabeTe War; he was to have nothing to do with the conduct 
of the war itself or other extraneous subjects. The Colonial Secretary 
reiterated the point that it was desirable that Newton should understand 
clearly that he should not be led into all the various debateable subjects 
which had been discussed in the papers and on which witnesses might feel 
strongly.(55) Not surprisingly Ripon was thoroughly satisfied with Newton's 
'clear and impartial' inquiry which 'exonerated Jameson and the officers of 
the British South Africa Company from the serious charges made against them'.(56)
Henry Labouchere's accusation that the Company being bankrupt 'got up 
the war' to improve their financial position(57) may or may not contain some 
truth, but it is certain that the war not only secured to the Company the 
salubrious, mineralised and fertile high veld in its entirety, but it also 
solved the difficulty of the Colonial Office with regard to sovereignty and 
jurisdiction.
Buxton, the Liberal Under Secretary for the Colonies, acknowledged the 
fact in the House of Commons that hostilities had necessarily altered the 
position of affairs,(58) which had been very unsatisfactory. The North 
Borneo Company acquired wide powers of administration before their application 
for a charter,(59) but Lobengula was a rather different proposition, from the 
ineffectual 'Brummagen Sultans of Borneo'. (50) The Colonial Office knew 
from the start that the Rudd Concession conferred no powers of governmental) 
and that no one could exercise jurisdiction without Lobengula's permission,(62) 
but the Charter was drafted nevertheless, empowering the Company (in Clauses 
3 and 4)' to assume such functions of government as Her Majesty's Government 
might think it desirable for them to undertake. These powers of government 
would have to be got when a favourable time occurred to approach Lobengula.(63)
By way of providing for the contingency of no such favourable time arising in 
the near future, and grants of jursidiction from native Chiefs (in Bechuanaland) 
being unobtainable, the Colonial Office inserted into the final draft of the 
Charter the debateable Clause 10: (64)
The Company shall ... preserve peace and order in such 
ways ... as it shall consider necessary, and may with 
that object make ordinances (to be approved by Our 
J ; Secretary of State) and may establish and maintain a 
force of Police.
As Taylor frequently states, without explanation, the Colonial Office 
maintained for the first few years a rigid policy of non-interference in the
Company's administration, in spite of this lack of legitimate jurisdiction.
In 1891 the High Commissioner issued a Proclamation by which he hoped to 
'restrain the indiscriminate exercise of Lobengula's sovereign rights' in 
granting concessions like the Lippert Concession which Loch feared would lead 
to massive Boer immigration.(65) Knutsford however regarded the Proclamation 
as the first step towards annexation and as an infringement of the powers 
granted to the Company by the Charter, and emphasised that the Company should 
bear all the responsibility of government, that no steps should be taken to 
supersede the Charter and relieve the Company of its principal obligations, 
that the Company should legislate and administer as far as practicable, and that 
the Order in Council which had been passed to render annexation unnecessary 
should only be exercised where the powers of the Company appeared to be defect­
ive.(66)
- 6 -
When the clash occurred between the Company's Police and the Chief 
Ngomo, in which Loch thought that the Company's local officers had acted somewhat 
in excess of the requirements of the case, Loch, understanding that it was the 
Government's wish that he should not interfere in the administration of the 
Company's territories, asked whether the Colonial Secretary wished him to take 
notice of such acts.(66a) The Colonial Secretary referred him to clause 18 
of the Charter and added that as a general rule'any interference by the High 
Commissioner in Mashonaland affairs should be confined within the lines laid 
down by this clause. It was important that nothing should be done which could 
tend to relieve the Company's representatives at the Cape from a full sense of 
their primary responsibility for the policy of the Company in Mashonaland.'(67)
He told the Company in London, rather ingenuously in view of his instructions 
to Loch, that Lendy's report would have justified much stronger terms of 
remonstrance from the High Commissioner and that 'after making full allowance 
for the difficulties attending the establishment of European administration 
in a country such as Mashonaland' he could not avoid the conclusion that Lendy 
had acted with recklessness and undue harshness. To avoid the risk of such 
proceedings damaging the reputation of the Company, they should send stringent 
instructions to the Administration in Mashonaland as to the steps to be taken 
for the prosecution and arrest of natives charged with offences for which 
territorial magistrates had jurisdiction.(68) Complaints were made in the 
House of Commons that Knutsford's censure of Lendy was net strong enough, and in 
the circumstances the Charter's powers of restraint as exercised by the Colonial 
Secretary were restrained indeed.
It is curious that, acknowledging as he did, the difficulty of establish­
ing a European administration in a country such as Mashonaland, the Colonial 
Secretary should have been so adamant on the subject of non-interference by 
experienced government officials. The Company's men were administratively 
inexperienced (the only experienced officer, Archibald Colquhoun, had soon been 
dispensed with), and were acting on behalf of a newly constituted financial 
corporation, in an extensive and comparatively unknown country. It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that the Colonial Office insisted repeatedly on non­
interference by the High Commissioner so as to leave the Company with a com­
pletely free hand in order to secure to themselves, when the opportunity should 
arise, that jurisdiction over the country which they needed, in the surest way 
they could, by conquest; and without blame to the Colonial Office.
In 1892 in reply to Labouchere's question regarding the Crown's author­
ity and the right to legislate, de Uorms had asked for notice of the question,(69) 
but.following the hostilities of 1893, in reply to Labouchere's question 'by 
what right is jurisdiction being exercised by the Chartered Company or the 
High Commissioner?' Buxton was able to answer unhesitatingly, 'By right of 
conquest'.(70) As Chamberlain later admitted: 'That the authority provided
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for by these instruments /the Charter and the Orders in Council of 1891 and 
1894/ has in the past proved ineffective may be ascribed to the (perhaps 
necessarily) great latitude given at first by the Board of Directors to their 
Officers in South Africa.1 It would have been nearer the truth to have 
referred to the great latitude given by the Colonial Secretary.(71)
There was a similar problem of jurisdiction in Barotseland, but as 
the development of Northern Rhodesia was slow and the white population, apart 
from officials, almost non-existent for many years, the problem was not urgent.’ 
The policy adopted was to whittle away Lewanika's jurisdiction in stages, and 
as the military organisation of the Barotse could not compare with that of the 
Matabele or of the Company, there was little difficulty. In 1903 the question 
arose of what to do with a native arrested for murder; strictly speaking he 
should have been handed over to Lewanika but that involved two unpleasant 
results, 'first to the Company, in that it will be putting a stumbling block 
in the way of jurisdiction which they are seeking to usurp from Lewanika', 
and second for the native in that Lewanika might put him to death. It was 
argued that in fact 'we have exercised and do exercise jurisdiction and powers 
of government with the tacit consent of Lewanika' and that 'by "usage and 
suffrance" we have jurisdiction in his territory.' The policy to be pursued, 
the Colonial Office advised, was that 'his assent should be obtained to what­
ever is done, in that his wishes should be met so far as is consistent with 
peace, order and good government',(72) and in the years that followed, the 
Company obtained all that it wanted in Barotseland with the assent, willing 
or not, of the Paramount Chief.
The attitude of the late nineteenth century Colonial Office to native 
land followed the principle laid down by the Colonial Secretary, Earl Grey, 
in 1846:
’ 'The opinion that the original inhabitants of any country
were the proprietors of every part of its soil of which 
they had been accustomed to make any use, or to which they 
had been accustomed to assert any title, was a doctrine, 
whether it was maintained on the grounds of religion or 
. morality or of expediency, from which he entirely dissented.
He subscribed to the principle laid down by Dr. Arnold that 
men were to make the earth by their labour what it had not 
been by itself. With labour so bestowed on it came the 
right of property in it, and so much did the right of 
property go along with labour, that civilised nations had 
never scrupled to take possession of countries inhabited 
only by tribes or savages.'(73)
Thus the Charter authorised the Company'to improve, develop, clear, 
plant, irrigate and cultivate any lands included within the territories of the; 
Company and to settle any such territories and land ... and to aid and promot'e 
immigration'. (Clause 24 vi & vii). Within a short time of arriving with the 
pioneer Column, Frank Johnson had formed a company with his friends Heany and 
Borrow to buy up pioneer farms and claim rights and had secured a hundred 
thousand acres 'of the best farm land in Hashonaland'.(74) In Matabeleland 
the farms of the Buiawayo Syndicate, whose manager was George Gray, cousin of 
the Administrator, Earl Gray, comprised 'some of the richest agricultural land 
in the country', and other private owners 'owned the most fertile stretches of 
corn-growing land'.(75) The Administrator later claimed that this land had 
been conveyed by the government subsequent to the selection by the Land 
Commission of the Shangani and Gwaai Reserves, but Sir Richard Martin stated 
that according to the Commission these districts were the only ones in which 
the Commissioners could assure themselves that no grants had been made to 
Europeans.
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Lord Ripon wrote after the war of 1894 that the aim must be to induce 
the Matabele to settle down peaceably, and that for this purpose it would be 
necessary that 'good and habitable land, water and cattle adequate to their 
subsistence' should be secured to them.(76) A draft agreement was prepared 
by the High Commissioner for the administration of the country and the security 
of the natives, in which this phrase 'good and habitable' land never appeared 
again but became 'sufficient apid suitable' land.(77) Rhodes was consulted 
and his comments carefully considered, and an amended version was prepared.(78) 
Palmer writes (79) that in these negotiations Rhodes consistently and in many 
cases successfully resisted attempts to limit the Company's freedom of action 
and that the negotiations are illustrative of the 'gradual withering away of 
Imperial assertiveness', and that Rhodes successfully 'demanded, in defiance 
of Loch's earlier proposals, that the Commission's provisions should be con­
fined to Matabeleland'. But there is no evidence that Rhodes had to 'demand' 
anything or 'defy' anyone. The memo was only a draft prepared by Loch for 
discussion. The Imperial Government was not in a position to be 'assertive' 
since by the Charter it had granted certain powers to the Company regarding 
land,.which did not include the provision of reserves for the native population, 
and it could not legally dictate what the Company should or should not do in 
the allocation of land; it could only require some show of concern for native 
needs - without going too deeply into the matter. In nineteenth century 
thought native interests were of secondary importance compared with those of 
Gray's 'civilised nations'. Reserves for natives satisfied humanitarian 
principles, but they were used in southern Africa to mask European encroachments 
on good land. The negotiations show that there was give and take rather than 
demands and defiance, and that the principle of the paramountcy of white 
interests was observed by both Colonial Office and Company. The Colonial 
Office told the Directors that they would see that comparing Loch's amended 
clauses with the corresponding clauses of the final version in the Colonial 
Office Memorandum,(80) Rhodes' views in most cases had been met by the additions 
and omissions desired by him, or by omissions and modifications which rendered 
his criticisms no longer applicable. Ripon would be glad to be favoured with 
the Directors' views and thought that the early settlement of the question 
was highly desirable; the papers were to be treated as 'strictly confidential'; 
a necessary precaution in view of the collaboration of the Government and the 
Company evident in them, and the watchfulness of the Aborigine Protection 
Society.
Loch suggested in his clause 20 that land, sufficient and suitable, 
should be assigned wherever 'application was made for European settlement within 
near proximity to lands occupied by natives'. This was omitted in the final 
version, clause 27, presumably because it was always claimed that no land with 
a large native population was ever taken for white settlement and as it stood 
the clause could be taken to imply that natives were being moved to make way 
for whites. In the next clause Loch stipulated that 'if the land assigned 
to the natives were insufficient for their just and proper requirements, an 
additional and sufficient portion should be allotted'. Rhodes objected that 
the Land Court would have already made a careful examination and allotted 
what in their opinion was a sufficient area for the natives at present existing 
in the country; as the clause stood he thought that it would make the Company 
liable to find free land for the natives as they increased in numbers, .and he 
felt sure that that was not meant. Loch agreed that it was not his intention 
that the Company should be held liable for all natives as they increased in . 
numbers. In the Colonial Office memo this section of the clause was left 
out and the final version (clause 28) merely arranged for an exchange of land 
if the reserve was required for mineral development. On the question of the, 
right of natives to acquire land, Rhodes wanted to omit that section of the 
clause (23) which provided protection for a native wishing to mortgage his
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property, but this the Colonial Office would not allow and the provision 
remained (clause 33). There was little likelihood of Africans being in a 
position to buy land for some years so the Colonial Office could afford to be 
firm on this particular aspect of native protection. With regard to the 
appointment of a Land Court (clause 25) they again agreed with Rhodes, who 
objected that the decision of a Court would be final. By the new clause (24), 
a Land Commission was appointed, because as Loch pointed out, its recommen­
dations would be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State and the 
final decision would then 'be more within the control of Her Majesty's Govern­
ment'. (78) It could also be more easily and less expensively changed. One 
Other small alteration was made at Rhodes' suggestion. Loch stipulated (in 
clause 25) that if a portion of land allotted to natives should be required 
for townships, railways or public works, fair compensation should be made 
'of equal value' elsewhere. Rhodes thought that as the mineral value of such 
land might be raised for consideration the clause should read fair compensation 
'of equal arable and grazing land elsewhere'. In the Colonial Office version 
this became 'just compensation in land elsewhere, convenient as possible and 
of equal suitability to their requirements'.
'Suitability' was another name for Yudelman's ‘dual standard of need': 
allocations apportioned according to the vastly superior need of the 'civilised' 
European compared with that of the 'primitive' African,(81) a principle in 
line with Earl Gray's statement of 1846. All subsequent exchanges between 
native reserve land and European owned land were requested, and granted, on 
the premise that the land was either 'suitable' for Europeans, or 'suitable' 
for natives. There was no need to be specific about the quality of the land 
to be exchanged, as the criterion of suitability for black or white was 
understood by both the Company and the Colonial Office.
When British Bechuanaland was taken over, the natives were immediately 
placed in beaconed reserves which they held under inalterable tribal rights.(82) 
When the Colonial Office was preparing to hand over the Protectorate to the 
Company in 1895 land was secured to the Chiefs, disappointingly generous 
according to the Company,(83) but only the two reserves, the Gwaai and the 
Shangani, were demarcated in Matabeleland; no others were assigned or rati­
fied by legislative enactment, a course which the Company always maintained 
would be highly detrimental to European settlement and to the general interests 
of the Company.(84) The Colonial Office was aware that the Company claimed 
all the land, including that which had always been in native occupation, by 
right of conquest,(85) and they were also aware that the Company did not favour 
the idea of reserves,(86) as they did not wish to tie up the land until its 
possibilities had become apparent. The attitude of the Colonial Office was 
that native taxation and native reserves were to be regarded as 'set-offs' 
against each other.(87) Nevertheless they did not press the Company unduly, 
they reminded the Resident Commissioner several times of the desirability of 
approving and proclaiming reserves in Mashonaland,(88) but the matter was not 
regarded as urgent: 'It appears that large numbers of natives are settled on 
private owners' land, and that the owners like to have them there.'(89)
While European settlement in the early years was not actively promoted 
as the emphasis was on mining, the natives were encouraged to remain on the 
most fertile land in order to grow food for themselves and the white mining 
population.(90) Until the White farmers and their cattle increased in number 
in the years immediately before the first World War, pressure on the good land 
was not excessive. At a private interview at the Colonial Office in 1910, 
Birchenough raised the question of native reserves and was met 'in a most 
sympathetic spirit by Hopwood and Just’, who both agreed that the closer 
settlement which was taking place in Southern Rhodesia made a rearrangement 
of the Reserves necessary, and they suggested that Milton should discuss the
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subject with the Resident Commissioner so that the proposals of the Company 
might be forwarded to the Colonial Office, proposals which would be 'sympath­
etically and favourably received'.(91)
The Resident Commissioner in 1912 raised the question of a final 
demarcation with some urgency. As the mineral resources of the country had 
not,come up to the high expectations of the Company, settlers were being en­
couraged to take up land, but large tracts of the best land were held by com­
panies, 'the Chartered Company allegedly being directly interested in some 
of those which were averse to opening their holdings to settlement', and..
Other: suitable land adjacent to the railways had to be found. The number 
■of readjustments and curtailments of the reserves began therefore to increase. 
Settlers accused the Company of lopping off as much of the good land from the 
Reserves as they could before the review of the Charter in 1914, a policy they 
complained, which would leave the new government with only worthless land to 
curtail. The Resident Commissioner considered that such a tinkering with the 
problem was unwise and was likely to irritate the natives.(92) The High 
Commissioner, Lord Gladstone, agreed that the Company should submit their 
proposals en bloc for a final decision.(93)
fw His own proposals were quite specific. Land forming reserves which 
ought not to be encroached on should be regarded as ’final reserves', that 
would obviously refer to land not suitable, as to soil, climate or accessi­
bility, for Europeans; land forming part of the reserves which was in excess 
of native requirements or was .'more suitable for European occupation' should 
ibe termed 'temporary reserves', exchanges of which could be empowered by the 
High Commissioner for land in the third category 'provisional reserves', that 
is land which was not already in native reserves but which was 'suitable for 
native occupation and not for European'. A certain measure of finality might 
thus be reached.(94) The Company, however, were reluctant to commit them­
selves to a final decision, but after much correspondence and several private 
interviews the Board finally agreed in January 1914 that they were disposed 
to favour the appointment of a commission and to accept Harcourt's view that 
native reserves must be regarded as a permanent institution.(95)
In one such interview in South Africa, the High Commissioner had 
explained to D.O Malcolm of the Company that the constant exchanges requested 
by the Company might leave him open to attack by radicals in the House of 
Commons if it were found that the natives had, in fact, suffered in the deals, 
but a commission could obtain more information independently of the Adminis­
tration than either he or the Resident Commissioner possessed, and it would 
remove the responsibility for making decisions from his shoulders.(96)
From the point of view of the Government, a Commission's decision could always 
be more easily defended than the decisions of an individual, especially if the 
selection of its members were confirmed by the High Commissioner.(97)
Gladstone's final advice to the Company, Malcolm wrote, amounted to a recomm­
endation that the Company should agree to a final settlement as the liability 
of clause 81 of the Order in Council 1898, requiring the assignment of land 
to natives 'from time to time', would pass to the new administration and might 
impinge on their own land holdings, but a final settlement would have to be 
accepted by the new government and the Company might be recognised 'as having 
clean title' to the rest of the land.(96)
Of these negotiations, Palmer writes that 'it was basically the Company's 
frustrations and the Colonial Office's fears which drove them to support a final 
settlement. The Company, having failed in its attack on the reserves, saw in 
the commission a chance to renew the attack, while the Colonial Office though 
recognising the advantages of its powers under the existing,elastic system,
-• n  -
was afraid that these would be diminished as the political power of the settlers 
increased: and as Rhodesia headed towards union with South Africa.' There is 
little evidence in the London Office papers that the Company were unduly 
frustrated over the question of reserves in Southern Rhodesia, or that the 
Colonial Office ever made any difficulty over the numerous exchanges of 
native- and white-owned land requested by the Company. As no reserves other 
than the Gwaai and the Shangani had oeen legally demarcated, there was nothing 
to 'attack' - the Company had itself demarcated provisional reserves., and 
exchanges could nave continued for some time, as the settlers realised. It 
was the finality of the settlement that the Company opposed, not the principle 
of reserves; the natives after all had to be accommodated somewhere. As 
for the 'fears' of the Colonial Office, why should they, when they had 
surrendered the administration of the native population to a commercial company 
in the grant of a charter, 'fear' the political power of the settlers? Why 
should they wish to retain responsibility for native affairs, which they had 
assumed in a limited and negative fashion by the Order in Council of 1898 
only because of the misdeeds of the Company, not because of an overwhelming 
desire to promote native interests?
Palmer refers to the South African Land Act of 1913 as having some 
influence on the attitude of the Colonial Office to native reserves, but in 
the quotation above, he writes of the fears of the Colonial Office that its 
powers would be diminished 'as Rhodesia headed towards union with Africa'.
But it had been assumed from the beginning that Rhodesia would eventually 
become part of a British union of South African states, and the Company's 
ordinances relating to native affairs were always reviewed by the Colonial Office 
with South African legislation in mind.(98) The pre-war Liberal Government, 
says Hyam, clearly intended that Rhodesia should become a constitutional part 
of South Africa.(99) It is more than likely that it was this Land Act of 
1913 that persuaded the Colonial Office to seek a final settlement of reserves 
in Southern Rhodesia to bring it into line with the rest of southern Africa.
In reply to protests against the Land Act by black South Africans, Harcourt 
maintained that he was unable to interfere, (100) and the HighCommissioner,
Lord Buxton tried to persuade the African Congress to accept land segregation,(101) 
as in their best interests, thus indicating the definite commitment of the 
Colonial Office to the provision of permanent reserves.
The Company asked that the commission should he given wide powers 'in 
the direction of recommending alterations, diminutions and increases in the 
areas of the reserves as at present constituted, since it is particularly 
important in a permanent settlement of the nature proposed, to ensure that 
the land reserved for natives and that allocated for occupation by European 
settlers shall be as suitable as possible to their requirements.'(102) In 
a friendly letter to the Company the Colonial Office enclosed a rough draft 
of the Commission's terms of reference.8103) Harcourt, in a subsequent 
despatch, stated that he believed that the Company might wish for the insertion 
of words enabling the Commissioners, if they thought fit, to make recommen­
dations for any 're-adjustments of the reserves that may be necessary'; and 
to meet the point Harcourt v.'as willing to make certain insertions and substi­
tutions. The relevant paragraph (with the insertions underlined) finally- 
read:
'in case any Reserve shall appear to be insufficient as 
aforesaid or to be in any way unsuitable to examine 
such other areas as may be indicated by divers author­
ities as suitable and to recommend the assignment in 
addition to or in substitution for existing reserves 
such portions thereof as you may consider to be desir­
able and necessary.'(104)
This despatch would have been in reply to the letter from Malcolm to 
Lambert at the Colonial Office which Palmer mentions (p.l29, Malcolm to Lambert,
26 March 1914), in which, says Palmer, Malcolm 'challenged the proposed terms 
of reference and substituted terms which allowed the commission to readjust 
the reserves as it thought fit', but the tone of the letter from Lambert with 
the draft terms and the opinions expressed earlier by the High Commissioner 
show that there was no need to ’challenge'' the Colonial Office as if they were 
opponents of the Company with different views on the subject. The Government 
were pursuing a certain political course in the wider sphere of imperial 
politics and the agreement of the Company, as the effective authority in 
Rhodesia, was essential. The many private interviews indicate lengthy discussion 
but there is no reason to suppose that it was conducted in anything but a quiet 
atmosphere of compromise. Palmer says that the Colonial Office wanted pro­
vision made for all possible future African needs (p.152), a questionable 
proposition, but African needs ware of slender importance in the Imperial 
Government's wider schemes, as is shown in their whole policy towards South 
Africa.
Various undertakings given hy the Colonial Office to the Directors 
were carried out in the Order in Council giving effect to the recommendations 
of the Commission, but with regard to the railway strip through the Sabi 
Reserve the Colonial Office made one reservation. A twelve-mile strip was 
allowed in place of the usual fifty yards because 'the white settler needs the 
railway more than the native' because he has goods brought and sent, and as 
he uses it more 'his contribution to the revenue is greater' ,(105) but 
nowhere was it to be wider than twelve miles even though in some places, to 
avoid native settlements and burial places, the str^p would be narrower than 
twelve miles. There was to be no compensation for the loss of width in the 
more densely settled areas.(106) This, the only concession to native inter­
ests, was made in response to the vigorous protests of the missionaries.
The projected railway line Umvuma and Odzi has never been built, but a 
fertile stretch of country was secured by the Company.
In Northern Rhodesia the attitude of the Colonial Office was governed 
by different considerations. In 1910 the Company was still opposed to re­
serves: any proposal from the Government was to be strongly resisted as not 
being necessary in Northern Rhodesia in the absence of any pressure of 
European population,(107) out by 1913 applications for land began to increase 
in number especially in the Fort Jameson area, and the Company therefore 
requested the Government to sanction thei^ proposed reserves.(108) The 
land in north eastern Rhodesia could not be claimed by conquest but was 
held under H.H. Johnston's Certificates of Claim and under the provisional 
title of Weise's concession, under both of which no native village existing 
at the date of the Certificate could be moved without the consent of Her 
Majesty's Government.(109/ No land could ue alienated to Europeans, therefore, 
without the sanction of the Government to the removal of natives, and as the 
Administration had no power to move them but could only persuade, land settle­
ment was held up. At first the Colonial Office was prepared to consider 
the question of reserves. In 1915, Buxton thought that though the acreage 
allowed for.each person did not seem sufficient, proposals appeared to be 
formulated 'with due regard to the reasonable requirements of the natives'.(110) 
The subject was then postponed until afte^ the war. The Buxton Committee, 
however, in its Second Report of 1921 recommended (clause 19) that 'it may 
be desirable later on to delimit reserves in certain districts' but that 
'until the position has further developed we do not recommend any action in 
this direction'.(Ill) The position referred to the ultimate ownership of 
the land; it was conceivable that the Privy Council would judge in favour 
of the natives being declared the owners of the land. In spite of repeated
requests from the Company and their subsidiary,the North Charterland Explor­
ation Company, the Colonial Office refused to appoint the desired commission.(112) 
As in Southern Rhodesia, the question was not one of native interests but of 
the Administrative deficits.(ill) If the Reserves were finally demarcated 
and sanctioned, the Company could sell or lease the remaining land, and if 
on the review of the Charter in 1024 the Country became a Crown Colony, the 
Imperial Government would have deprived themselves of a revenue to pay off 
the deficit.
In the provision o.f land for immigrant natives in Southern Rhodesia, 
the Colonial Office made clear its attitude to one purpose of reserves. In 
January 1900 J.F. Perry wrote in a minute on the subject, 'Of course the 
Company in settling these bodies of natives in Southern Rhodesia do not 
desire to give them a large enough reserve to support them in idleness - 
which is I suppose the standard of the ordinary native reserve - that would 
defeat the object of importing them i.e. to get them to work on the mines', 
and he added, 'I am not sure that the Resident Commissioner is alive to this 
point of view.'(113) Chamberlain therefore wrote of the Resident Commission­
er's doubts as to the sufficiency of land provided as reserves for the 
immigrants: 'I consider that in encouraging native immigrants into Rhodesia 
with the object of supplying a force of labour for the mines, care should be 
taken that prospective immigrants are made aware that they will not be able 
to live entirely on the land allotted to them.'(114) The size of reserves 
was thus among other considerations, an important aspect of the labour question.
The provision of sufficient labour for the Company's enterprises was 
a perennial problem, but one on which the Colonial Office were unable to be 
as accommodating as on the question of land. They sympathised with the Com­
pany's difficulties and invited them to submit proposals on the lines of the 
Glen Grey Act, (115) which had been welcomed by the humanitarians, for while 
it provided for a form of labour tax, it also provided for individual land 
tenure in the Reserves, which was thought to be a step forward in the 
civilising of the natives. The Colonial Office also suggested the regu­
lating of lobola as furnishing another form, besides taxation, of 'indirect 
inducement*1 to labour. (116) They took great exception to the Chief Native 
Commissioner's words to the Indunas around the country, that as salaried 
officials of the Government they were expected to supply labour. This, 
wrote F. Graham, was likely to lead to a form of compulsion, 'but how are ' 
they to get labour except through the Indunas?1(116) However understanding 
the Colonial Office was and however willing to consider any other scheme of 
indirect inducement^ 117) they could not countenance any suspicion of com­
pulsory labour. Sir A. ililner, the High Commissioner, was in favour of some 
pressure on the natives to induce them to work, he had no objections ‘to a 
well-regulated system of state compulsion'(118) and he allowed a compulsory 
labour clause to stand in the draft Regulations of 1898.(119) Chamberlain 
refused to consider it 'because strong opposition would be excited in Parlia­
ment, especially in view of the past action of the Native Commissioners on which 
Sir Richard iiartin's Report was based'.(120)
After the Pariiamentary Inquiry following the Raid and the Risings, 
the Imperial Government undertook to exercise a-closer control over the 
Chartered Company especially with regard to native policy, and a new Order 
in Council was issued for this purpose. If it became known, Graham wrote, 
that Native Commissioners, appointed under this Order in Council 1898, with 
the intention that they should be the protectors of the natives, (121) were 
being employed by the Administration to bring pressure 'only short of force' 
on the natives to v.'ork, as Sir Marshall Clarke reported, then the Colonial 
Office, responsible to Parliament for the actions of the Administration, would 
also be held responsible by Parliament for any disturbance of the peace in 
Rhodesia. 'This Department,' wrote H. Just, 'must take some action in
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self-defence,‘(122) and a strong letter protesting against the use of Native 
Commissioners as recruiting and distributing agents was sent to the Company.
The great concern of the Colonial Office not to be found guilty of condoning 
compulsory labour may well have been influenced by an active campaign being 
waged at that time, both in and out of Parliament, by the Aborigine Protection 
Society, greatly strengthened by ardent free traders, for Foreign Office and 
Colonial Office support in reforming the Administration of the Congo.(123)
The Society was gravely concerned with reports and allegations of ill-treatment 
and forced labour among British West African recruits in the Congo, and the 
free traders were anxious to break Leopold's monopolies granted in contravention 
of the; fifth Article of the Berlin General Act of 1886. Together they were 
able to turn the Congo question from a'pro!iferation of sensational stories' 
to an 'academic discussion of colonial principles' and the observance of 
treaty obligations.(124) Hence the sensitivity of the Colonial Office to. 
charges of forced labour and its firmness with the Company.
This concern is clearly illustrated in the wacnamara episode in 
Northern Rhodesia. After an inquiry the Pistrict Officer Macnamara had been 
found guilty of flogging natives 'without trial to induce them to pay hut tax, 
and of compelling natives to go to work for the Native Labour Bureau.(125)
He was eventually dismissed for concubinage with an African woman. The 
whole correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Company reveals a 
somewhat indulgent attitude on the part of the Colonial Office to the Adminis­
tration's coercion of natives whose labour was so essential to the profitability 
of the Company's commercial enterprise, and the dismissal of an administrative 
officer because of his personal way of life was less damaging to the reputation 
of either the Company or the Colonial Office than dismissal for flogging 
natives and compelling them to labour.
It is clear that the Congo question had some influence on the actions 
of the Colonial Office. The suspension of Hacnamara became dismissal only 
after the letter from the Aborigine Protection Society with its reference to 
criticism of this country's policy 'in contrast with that of others'.(126)
In February the Foreign Office sent to the Under Secretary for the Colonies 
a report from the Belgian minister about the 'graves mefaits' of a British 
recruiter of labour in the Congo.(127j Lord Crewe wrote to the High Commiss­
ioner, 'you will appreciate the importance of a complaint of this description 
against a British subject in the Congo Free State.'(127)
On one other question was the Colonial Office equally firm with the 
Company and that was on the intention of the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia 
to raise the Hut Tax from ten shillings to twc pounds in 1903. They were 
prepared for a proposal to that effect 'the revenue will probably be greater 
in view of the proposed increase of native taxation.(129) Chamberlain promised 
the Company that he would not object to the raising of the hut tax if the High 
Commissioner and the Resident Commissioner agreed.(130) To a deputation 
from Rhodesia which he received in Johannesburg, he said he saw no objection 
to increasing the tax to the same amount as was imposed in Transvaal, two 
pounds, but that he v/ould not pledge himself, 'iie would have to satisfy himself 
that the increased taxation v/ould not cause serious trouble, as I do not want 
an insurrection'.(131) In the considerable correspondence from those in 
favour of the increase to two pounds and those against it, the Colonial Office 
found it difficult to get at the truth; they thought that all the positions 
taken up were purely selfish, but that the balance of evidence was against 
the expediency of exacting two pounds at that particular time, and that 
the Administration would have been well advised to content itself with one 
pound, (132) a ten shilling increase. What finally decided them against the 
new hut tax ordinance was the report from the Resident Commissioner, which 
stated that two pounds was too high for Southern Rhodesia, that the time was 
not opportune as the harvest was poor, and that the natives had only just had 
a new hut tax ordinance in 1SC1 after paying the original tax for barely
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three years; he was therefore unable to recommend it 'as he feared that the 
rapid rise proposed would unsettle the natives and may endanger the security 
and good order of the country'.(133) The Colonial Office decided that it 
would be a serious matter to override Sir Marshal Clarke's views: 'if the papers 
were published the case would not look strong enough should there be trouble.1(134) 
The governing consideration, as pointed out by 6. Fiddes, 'was that they should 
run no risk of a native disturbance'.(135) The main issue, as in the pro­
vision of Reserves, was not primarily the protection or consideration of 
native interests, but the security of the Company and the settlers, and the 
peace of mind of the Colonial Office.
Paramountcy of native interests was largely an ideal of the post- 
Great War period, and then in the predominantly black countries, not in the 
white settler countries of southern Africa. A glimmer of this idea of para­
mountcy occurred during Lord Elgin's term at the Colonial Office in the Liberal 
Government of 1906. The 1301 concession from Lewanika gave the Company the 
right to make grants of land in Barotseland-North l7est Rhodesia with the except­
ion of the Barotse Valley, but it gave the Company no express right to retain 
any money from such grants to third parties.(136) Two further concessions 
were therefore sought and obtained in March 1905 and January 1906 enabling the 
Company to retain any money received from the disposition of the land.
Neither of these concessions was ratified by the Secretary of State. In 
July 1906 Lord Elgin was doubtful about ratification as the concessions seemed 
to.amount to the grant of the whole North Weste n Rhodesia except Lewanika's 
own reserve.(137) The following year the Colonial Office sent to the Company 
a draft of the conditions on which they were prepared to approve the con­
cessions. The Company complained with some spirit that entirely new features 
were being introduced into the subject, the effect of which would be to destroy 
the: commercial value of the Company's land concessions in North Western 
Rhodesia, which, as the Company's Counsel pointed out, they had acquired like 
any other commercial company as an asset for its shareholders and this aspect 
of the Company's undertaking had been repeatedly recognised by the British 
Government.(138) The conditions were that the proceeds from the land thus 
acquired should go towards defraying the cost.of the administration and its 
deficits, and that five per cent of the proceeds should be spent for the bene­
fit of the natives.(137) Wilson Fox, the Manager of the Company, at an inter­
view with the High Commissioner at Johannesburg, declared that the Company 
had every right to expect that under its Charter every concession which it 
obtained properly should be ratified as a matter of course and that the recent 
attempts of the Colonial Office 'to whittle away the Company’s commercial rights 
... was an act of high-handed injustice'.(136)
The desire that the natives should derive some benefits from the 
Company's revenue was rather a new idea. Mhen an amended hut tax was intro­
duced in 1901, the Resident Commissioner pointed out that the natives in Rhod­
esia derived little benefit from their contribution to taxation compared with 
Basutoland, and Zululand when under Imperial rule, but G. Grindle did not 
think, in commenting on the Commissioner's despatch, that they need press 
the point on a hut tax which was regarded as the natives' contribution to 
the cost of government, and. the Secretary of State had indicated clearly, he 
wrote, that any labour tax should be spent for the good of the natives.(139)
As a labour tax was never assented to, as Chamberlain had decided that the 
four pound labour tax proposed by the Rhodesian deputation that called on 
him in Johannesburg could not be allowed as it exceeded native taxation in 
the Transvaal,(140) this was the first clear suggestion from the Colonial 
Office that the Company should set aside some money specifically for advancing 
the interests of the natives. Following the receipt of Elgin's despatch 
of June 1907, Fox had a private interview at the Colonial Office with Alex.V'
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Harris ('he is a friend of ours and will do what he can for us1)(141) who 
said that the Company could regard the despatch as a 'ballon d'essai', a 
'try-on'. Both Harris and another friend of the Company at the Colonial 
Office, Sir Francis Hopwood, advised the Company to act with caution and let 
the matter stand over for a time, and Hopwood was sanguine that the decision 
of the Law Officers of the Crown would be in favour of the Company. The 
ballon d'essai failed to leave the ground as the Company were within their rights 
according to clause 3 of their Charter, whereby the Company was authorised 
and empowered to acquire land by concessions, grants or treaties and to hold, 
use or exercise such territories, lands and properties 'for the purposes of 
the Company'. The country's revenues having once been given away by the 
Charter could not legally be reclaimed. In 1908 the new Colonial Secretary,
Lord Crewe, was prepared to waive the conditions objected to by the Directors 
of the Company, and with certain innocuous conditions the concessions were 
ratified.(142) In their cable announcing the ratification the Company instruct­
ed the Administrator to approach Lewanika for yet another concession(143) 
which would give the Company the remaining land to the east of Lewanika's 
reserve in the Barotse Valley. The Colonial Office had no objection to the 
endorsement of this grant, and at a private interview between Hopwood and 
Sir Henry Birchenough, H. Just, at the request of Hopwood, agreed to expedite 
the matter as much as possible,(144) and no controversial conditions were 
imposed.
Of the advantages of imperialism through chartered companies, not the 
least was the avoidance by the Imperial Government of native administration. 
The claims of the civilised communities and justice to the natives were in 
the circumstances almost irreconcilable, since the cost of exploiting the 
resources of a large continent could only be made profitable on the basis of 
cheap and landless labour.(145) As the object of late nineteenth century 
government was to promote the commerce and industry of their people in all 
parts of the world, it was better that Government should not, where avoidable, 
concern itself with the possibly conflicting interests of native rights.
Having surrendered the administration of natives to a chartered commercial 
company, the Colonial Office could not properly interfere on behalf of the 
natives without curtailing the commercial opportunities which they had 
granted the Company in their Charter.
The Company realised that on the whole it was better off under a 
Conservative Government. When the Liberals took office in 1906 and the new 
Under Secretary for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, spoke in the House of 
Commons for a more liberal policy towards native affairs in Africa, Fox wrote 
to Milton, the Southern Rhodesian Administrator: 'We are all shocked at the 
attitude of our nev,1 masters ... it is quite evident therefore that we must 
walk warily in regard to this question, and for the moment lie low.'(146) A
month later, however, he was writing of the semi-official talks he had had 
at the Colonial Office: 'I may add that in all my recent interviews with 
the Colonial Office I have noticed a marked improvement in tone, and that 
the various officials appear to sympathise with the work of the Company and 
desire to help it.‘(147) Although some Liberals admitted that they were not 
very much in favour of government by chartered companies, like Buxton, who 
also pointed out that his Government was tied by the acts of their prede­
cessors,(148) the Company did not suffer unduly under Liberal Governments.
Lord Ripon withheld his consent to the amalgamation of the companies inter­
ested in the Shashi-Hakloutsie area, not on a question of principle but 
because he feared that Baron d'Erl anger's Company had been left out.(149)
He was prepared to hand over the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Company(150) 
though Harcourt was not.(151) It was under a Liberal Government that the 
negotiations with the Company, begun under the previous Conservative Govern­
ment, for a guarantee of twenty thousand pounds for the Bechuanaland railway,
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was agreed to, without the previous consent of Parliament.(152) Harcourt 
wrote very sharply in 1912 that he proposed taking proceedings unless the Company 
made an early settlement of the taxes due to the government of Nyasaland(153) 
and he refused the Company's request for Imperial assistance in the Company's 
extraordinary war expenditure (154) which his Conservative successor, Bonar Law, 
immediately acceded to,(155) but when the British Government were contemplating 
a commercial treaty with Portugal, he consulted the Company confidentially,, 
stating that he would be glad to learn whether there were any special matters 
of importance that they would desire to be borne in mind.(156) And he was 
nothing.if not co-operative on the question of native.reserves.
On the. native franchise, the Liberal attitude differed little from 
that of the Company. The Elected ‘"embers and the people of Southern Rhodesia 
were unanimous, Milton claimed in 1906, in wishing to prevent any large addition 
to the native vote, and r-i1 ton, thinking the subject should be dealt with before 
the growth of large vested interests, consulted the High Commissioner privately.(157) 
The High Commissioner, Lord Selborne, was of the opinion that Her Majesty's 
Government would not approve any suspension of the right of natives to the 
franchise, but he agreed that raising the qualifications generally.would meet 
the case.(158) The Colonial Office concurred, Lord Elgin pointing out that 
there was no constitutional objection to making a change in the Southern 
Rhodesian franchise by an ordinance passed by the Legislative Council. The 
change in the qualifications for voters was a matter entirely for the decision 
of the Legislature. Elgin's main concern was that no change would be made 
without consideration of its bearing on the ultimate solution of the problem 
for a uniform franchise to be adopted by South Africa, of which Rhodesia was 
likely soon to become a part.(159) Elgin, Hyam says, was not very enthusiastic 
about the Cape franchise: the time would come when the natives would control 
the elections; 'are we prepared to subordinate whites to native rule under 
such circumstances?'(160) The Conservative Under Secretary for the Colonies 
heartily approved the recommendation of the Buxton Committee that the right 
of the native to the franchise should be protected.(161) Both parties were 
agreed on this as long, it seems, as it constituted no threat to white 
supremacy.
It was the same with discriminatory legislation. In the draft 
Agreement of 1894, Rhodes had wished that clause 17 which stipulated that no 
restrictive legislation should be imposed on natives which did not equally 
apply to persons of European descent, save in. respect of arms, ammunition, 
liquor and title to land (in the Reserves) should be omitted as they might 
find that there were some exceptions not named which the High Commissioner 
might approve of but v/hich the Company would be debarred from dealing with.(162)
The High Commissioner in his amended draft therefore added 'an important 
proviso' which became in the f-atabeleland Order in Council of 1894 (section 
b of clause 23) 'or any matter in respect of which the Secretary of State 
upon the recommendation of the High Commissioner thinks fit to authorise an ■ 
ordinance o r ^  Regulation'. This enabled the Company's Administration to 
have Ordinance 11 of 1904 assented to, which conferred powers on local author­
ities to pass discriminatory bye-laws regulating the use of public streets 
by natives. The saving clause belied the claim that there was no discrimin­
atory legislation in the Company's territories, and it was inserted by a 
Liberal Government.
Both Liberal and Conservative Governments shared the Company's atti­
tude to native education. In considering the education provided by the London 
Missionary Society for natives in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Grindle -
minuted, 'There can be no doubt that the education of African natives ought1 
to include the more technical than the_purely literary instruction ... express 
general concurrence with his /Tlilner's/ preference for industrial training,
which certainly ought to be combined with any purely literary education.'
H.W. Just agreed.(164) Elgin too laid great stress on the encouragement 
of industrial education amongst the natives; hitherto their education had 
been 'too exclusively literary'(165) and, like the Company, the Colonial 
Office did not like the idea of Lewanika's sons being educated in England.(166)
It was Buxton, the Liberal Under Secretary for the Colonies, who 
defended the Company in the House of Commons in 1893, reminding the members 
that whatever the Company might have done in a wrong direction, ‘if it had not 
been for their existence this country would have lost the large part of Africa, 
which is a place of the future'.(167) The Colonial Office was as keen as the 
Company 'to get all we can' in defining the boundary of North Western Rhodesia 
with Portugal,(168) under a Conservative Ministry, and the Liberal Colonial 
Secretary Halter Long consulted the Company confidentially for their views on 
the Anglo-Congolese boundary.(169) Whatever their political party, Secretaries 
of State were 'anxious to avoid injuring the commercial interests of the share­
holders', (Chamberlain in 1896),(170) 'anxious not to interfere in any way with 
the reasonable freedom of the Company' (Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office 
in 1912),(171) and 'would not do anything to injure the position of the 
Company'.(W. Long in 1917).(172)
Thus in the main, the Colonial Office saw eye to eye with the Company, 
but the Company, having been given an inch, were always prepared to take an 
all. They resented any restrictions being placed on their activities because 
of the need to make concessions to the opinions of 'Westminster. On some 
issues the Colonial Office were indulgent. Sir Richard Martin, 'a plain 
soldier without guile',(173) had to be removed from his post of Deputy 
Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia'because of his strained relations with the 
Chartered Company in,consequence of his report on the native labour question',(174) 
suitably rewarded with a thousand pounds from the Company at Chamberlain's 
request(175) and a C.B.E. from.:-the Imperial Government. The Colonial Office 
also met the Company as far as it could on the subject of the supplemental charter, 
that was insisted on after the Parliamentary Inquiry into the Raid. The 
Colonial Office realised that not only did the Company dislike it, but that 
they were trying to smuggle it through at an annual general meeting(176) when 
an extraordinary meeting was required, and were even hoping to 'give it the 
go-by’. They could not acquiesce in the Company's wish to have the Supple­
mental Charter made less public by including it in an Order in Counci 1 ,(177)
'as the scheme had been laid before Parliament and the withdrawal of any of 
its provisions would be a breach of faith with Parliament'. The Colonial 
Office however made verbal alterations to meet the objections of the Directors, 
ancj were willing to indulge the Company to the extent of waiving the formality 
of a Petition which should precede the Charter, but to the Gazetting of which 
the Company so objected.(178)
On two other issues the Company seemed to get their own way. The 
1898 Order in Council required (clause 79. i) that the Administration shall 
appoint a Secretary for Native Affairs; but the Company had appointed Milton 
as Administrator particularly because of his experience in the Native Depart­
ment in the Cape Colony, and as the Administrator was responsible in the first 
place to the Company, it was from their point of view advantageous to have 
the posts of Administrator and Secretary for Native Affairs combined in one 
person. From the point of view of the Colonial Office, a separate Secretary 
whose appointment and dismissal were both subject to the assent of the Secre­
tary of State, would have given them rather more control of native affairs, 
but the Company insisted on Milton's appointment as Secretary. Chamberlain 
agreed, and Harcourt agreed to the arrangement as long as Mil ton held office.
After Milton had retired, and when a new Order in Council was being contemplated,
... 1& -
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Harcourt thought that the time had come for the appointment of an official of 
high standing and special qualifications to represent the Native Department 
in the Administration and in the Legislative Counci 1.(179)
With regard to the question of the revenues from land in Northern 
Rhodesia., the Company refused to he moved by the Colonial Office/ Harcourt 
in 1910 endorsed Crewe's statement of April 1909 that he 'would not admit that 
land revenues could be treated as an asset accruing to the Company absolutely 
irrespective of any provision being made for meeting the expenses of the 
Administration'. The Company protested strongly that any asset of the Company 
or revenue from assets should be regarded as in any way earmarked for future 
provision of administrative revenue.(180) On both these issues, the Company 
could affirm the law. The Charter (clause 3) protected the Company's 
revenues; and although the Colonial Office thought it was undesirable that the 
Administrator should also be Secretary for Native Affairs, there was little 
they could do about it, because, for the Administrator so to appoint himself, 
did not contravene the Order in Counci 1.(181)
The Colonial Office was quite alive to the various subterfuges of the 
Company. The controversial Hut Tax Ordinance was 'complicated by the fact' 
that it had been passed before the Administration knew whether the Secretary 
of State would agree, 'it was distinctly bad management ... and I cannot help 
suspecting that it was done partly with the idea of forcing his hand.'(182)
The Company particularly disliked the heavy burden of the Police which the 
Imperial Government had placed on them, and they made several attempts to 
evade the issue, but the Colonial Office was aware of their intentions: 'The 
Company would like to abolish the B.S.A.P. or to reduce them to the lowest 
number for two reasons (1) they would like to throw the responsibility for 
native disturbance on the Imperial Government, and (2) they want to have control 
of an armed constabulary for service anywhere in the country, in the direction 
of which they will in no way be hampered by the Commandant General and the 
Resident Commissioner.1(183) Although they admitted that the attitude of 
the Government to the Southern Rhodesian Administration on this question was 
a purely political one, their principle was that 'it would not be consistent 
with the public undertaking which has been made to allow the British South 
Africa Company itself to control a:large body of armed police'.(183)
Attempts by the Company to circumvent the Colonial Office and to rouse 
public opinion on important issues like these were resisted by the Colonial 
Office. Native Commissioners were forbidden to recruit and direct labour, 
they were only to advise, the duty of the Administration was to take no part 
in recruiting but to prevent abuses; the Hut Tax Ordinance of 1903 was dis­
allowed, and the Police remained under the control of an Imperial Officer.
And in 1901, for instance, the Colonial Office disallowed the Administrator's 
dismissal of a native, commissioner by abolishing his post, as a means of 
avoiding submission to the Secretary of State for his approval, as required 
by the Order in Council of 1898;(184) required the amendment of the Master 
and Servants Ordinance 5n of lun! '"here it departed seriously from the Cape 
laws up to 1891, which was the original law of Southern Rhodesia-,(185) 
refused to allow the Administration to re-enact Native Regulations by Ordinance 
in order to provide for a chief of staff or 'preumbulatory Secretary for 
Native Affairs' instead of by Proclamation: 'if this is done we shall lose 
control of native affairs. It is an extraordinary suggestion having regard 
to the position of the Imperial Government in relation to the natives.'(186)
A Volunteer Ordinance of 1903), 'the object and aim of which was to do away 
with the close control required in the Order in Council' was disallowed unless 
amended. It was obvious, the Colonial Office minuted, that'a very tight 
hand would have to be kept on Southern Rhodesian legislation 1;(185) 'the 
Secretary of State cannot allow the Administration to drive a coach and six
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through the Order in C o u n c i l (185) This was the crux of the relations 
between'the Colonial Office and the Company.
The Charter gave extensive powers to the Company, but the Order in 
Council 1898, though abrogating none of the provisions of the Charter, reser­
ved to the Secretary of State certain powers of control. All legislative 
enactments of the Company were to be judged in the light of these instruments, 
and as long as-their provisions were not infringed the manoeuvrings of the Com­
pany were irrelevant and immaterial. Initially the Charter had given the 
Company almost complete sovereignty, reserving to the Secretary of State 
slight powers of restraint: he could advise or remonstrate, but little more; 
but he could if he saw fit, advise the Crown to revoke the Charter (clause 35), 
or he could threaten to do so, 'though that threat could only be legally 
justified by the failure of the Company to conform to the provisions of the 
Charter'.(188) In 1894 and 1896 the Colonial Office had the legal right to 
revoke the Charter because of the Company's failure to preserve peace and order 
(clause 10), but for political reasons of their own they chose not to enforce 
it. The power was there, however, for any other government to use, and this 
knowledge was sufficient to keep the Company within bounds. The powers of 
control given to the Colonial Office by the Order in Council of 1898 referred 
only to native affairs and the Police. On these subjects the Colonial Office 
could ahd did intervene, not only by disallowing Ordinances, but also by 
insisting on the better treatment of native labourers on the mines, and on 
their welfare while travelling to and from their place of work, by the threat 
of the Colonial Secretary to disallow recruiting north of the Zambezi.(189) 
Williams' "cynic" might have said with some truth, that this was largely self- 
interest on the part of the Colonial Office and the Company, since natives 
refused to recruit for mines where the rates of mortality and sickness were 
high; and in fact the provision of medical and hospital services for natives 
was good in Southern Rhodesia where the mines were, but almost non-existent 
in Northern Rhodesia where the labourers were.
The Government's control of the Company was, as Earl Grenville said 
of the Borneo Company, 'of a negative character1.(190
'It was first proposed ... to provide that the Company 
should obey the directions of the Secretary of State.
But we decided that the power should be confined to 
a power of objection and dissent on matters affecting 
foreign powers and the treatment of natives - confined 
in fact to certain limited matters in which the con­
duct of the Company might conflict with the view- and 
policy of the Government, or with the public opinion 
in this country.'
Thus the Colonial Office could not initiate policy. They could only control 
or veto it. They had no power to insist that some portion of land revenues 
should be set aside for the benefit of natives, nor could they, even had they 
wished, forbid the alienation of land in freehold, or undertake the development 
of a peasant economy, as the British Government did in Uganda, since all were 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter.
The establishment of the Chartered Company in south and central Africa 
resolved the Imperial Government's problem of what to do about the reputedly 
rich interior. The amalgamation of Cape and London financial concerns 
enabled the Government to promote British commercial interests and at the same 
time to keep foreign powers out of the area, and to maintain, they hoped, 
British predominance in southern Africa. Though they fulfilled political 
and strategic aims of the Government in the wider sphere of foreign and 
imperial affairs in Africa, the Company administered Rhodesia, not as Amery
claimed, as agents of Her Majesty's Government,(191) but as agents 'under the 
Crown',(192) of their shareholders.
There is no evidence that the Colonial Office differed in principle 
from the Company, or attempted in any way to inhibit the Company's enterprise. 
Rather, as this paper has tried to she./, the reverse is true; as far as was 
consistent with public opinion as expressed at Westminster, and with the legal 
limitations imposed on them, they did their best to promote the Company's 
interests. Personal dislike of the Company is sometimes evident. Wilson 
Fox took particular exception to Just,(193) but it is quite evident that what­
ever his personal feelings, he, like the rest of the Colonial Office, shared 
with the Company, the same attitude to Imperial affairs.
This close co-operation between the Colonial Office and the Chartered Com­
panies is understandable. Civil servants of the higher ranks, government 
ministers and the Companies' directors all shared the same educational back­
ground, and came largely from the same social class, which was still, at the 
end of the nineteenth century, the governing class, with a strong social 
cohesion. It is noticeable throughout the official documents and the British 
South Africa Company's London Office papers how constantly controversial issues 
and policies were discussed in private interviews between Government Officials 
and senior Company officers. It was also the class with money to invest. 
Aristocrats were selected, some with royal connections, to decorate the Boards 
of Directors in order to impress the public, who in a spirit of hopeful patriot­
ism bought shares in the Chartered Companies, and were kept waiting for their 
dividends by both the North Borneo and the British South Africa Companies.
The profits were to be made in the manipulation of shares and in the subsidiary 
companies. Since wealth was a sure entre into society and since it was also, 
as Rhodes realised at an early age, power, the two classes - governing and 
financial - combined for their mutual benefit in the opening up of the unde­
veloped areas of the globe. This upper class with few and unpopular exceptions, 
like Goldwin Smith and Wilfred Blunt, believed firmly in the superiority of the 
white peoples, especially the British, and in the eventual disappearance of 
the primitive peoples. In the spirit of their time the Colonial Office, 
however humanitarian, and the Company never seemed to question that the role 
of the native was to be a labourer, and that the manifest duty of the whites, 
especially the British, was to develop and administer the undeveloped and 
'waste' places of the earth.
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APPENDIX 1
Companies associated with the BSA Company:-
Bechuanaland Exploration Co: Johnson, Heany, Borrow in Cape Town.
Lord Gifford (Chairman), George Cawston (Director).
Bechuanaland Trading Co: with fosenthal of Port Elizabeth as managers. 
Subsidiary of Bech. Exploration Co.
Bechuana Exploring Co: Subsidiary of Exploring Co. 0.Oakley and G.Cawston 
birectors in London; Johnson, Heany and Borrow in 'atabeleland; joined 
by Rhodes and Beit.
United Concessions Co: Gifford and J.O. Maund.
Shashi and Makloutsie Exploration Company: Amalgamation of Bech.Exploration 
and Exploring' Companies, United Concessions and Owners of the Wood, Francis 
and Chapman Concession - Baron d'Erlanger & Co.
Gold Fields of South Africa Co: Rhodes, Rudd, Beit.
De Beers AmalgamaTecTDia'mond f'iries: Rhodes, Beit.
Frank Johnson & C5T: Johnson, heany and Borrow with capital from Rhodes and 
the Gold Fields of South Africa Co.
Zambezi Exploring Company: Robert Williams; among original subscribers:
Lord Wantage, Lord Rothschild, Earl Grey of Howick, Robert Williams, Rhodes 
and Beit. Parent company of Robert Williams Group and responsible for 
forming Tanganyika Concessions Co.
African and General Exploring Co: understood to be more or less in alliance 
with the Chartered Co. (Afrn (S) 426, No.D6, C.O. to BSA 21 June 1892).
Beira Railway Co: Subsidiary of BSA Co. and promoted by them. BSA a con- 
trolling interest in the four railway companies.
North Charter!and Exploration Co:
Tati Concession "Co: taken over by BSA. Beit.
Land Companies and Syndicates: BSA alleged to be directly interested in several 
of the companies who stated to be averse to opening their holdings to 
settlement. (Col. Burns Begg in RC 3/3/29).
Bulawayo Syndicate: manager George Grey, cousin of Administrator Earl Grey.
Mashonaland Development Co: concession of 600,000 acres to Sir John 
Willoughby, military adviser to Dr. Jameson.
Liebig's Co: BSA large shareholders.
African lakes Co:
Companies and private individuals whose interests included in the
Amalgamated BSA Co:
Goldfields of South Africa
Austral African
Bech. Exploring
Baron d'Erl anger's Syndicate
Beit (Messrs. Jules, Parges and Co.)
Leask of Klerksdorp; Rhodes, Rudd, Beit, Maguire, Haggard, Ivy, Thompson.
Ware Concession in Barotseland bought by Rhodes.
G. and A, de Worms: Baron de Worms, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 
connected with this firm, which fought hard for grant of a Charter for the 
BSA Co. - some evidence that this firm was involved financially in Rhodes' 
schemes. (The Cape to Cairo Dream: Lois Raphael, 1936, p.79).
Wilson Fox writes of 'the subsidiary 'companies' reports I receive' (A 1/5/1 
& A 1/5/3), and of Admiral Markham 'our representative on the Board of the 
Globe and Phoenix Mine1. (A 1/5/3). Fox and Birchenough were directors 
of the Victoria Fall's Power Company, and Wilson Fox was a director of at 
least one of the mining companies.
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